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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

GOD ON TRIAL: ARE OUR MORAL JUDGMENTS DIFFERENT BASED ON
WHETHER WE ARE JUDGING GOD OR HUMANS?

Past work in moral psychology has demonstrated that individuals’ judgments of
other humans in hypothetical moral scenarios can be influenced by variables
such as intentionality, causality and controllability. However, while empirical
studies suggest that individuals similarly hold nonhuman agents such as robots
morally accountable for their actions to the extent that they are perceived to
possess humanlike attributes important for moral judgments, research is scant
when God is introduced as a nonhuman agent. On one hand it is proposed that
because people anthropomorphize God, our moral intuitions of humans and God
tend to show similar effects. In this case, both humans and God should be
morally blamed when they are perceived to have engaged in a moral
transgression. On the other hand, opinion polls suggest that the public at large
generally agrees that belief in God(s) is necessary for one to be moral. By
extension, our moral intuitions of God and humans should diverge significantly.
Both perspectives offer different predictions about how people morally judge God
and humans. This study attempts to test both perspectives by examining whether
moral judgments of God show similar patterns to the moral judgments of a
human (anthropomorphic perspective) or if judgments are biased toward God
even when an immoral deed has occurred (Divine Command perspective). A 2
(Target: human vs God) x 2 (Morality of scenario: moral vs immoral) x 3
(Scenarios: sexual assault vs robbery vs murder) mixed model design was
conducted to examine both hypotheses. Exploratory variables (i.e., Morality
Founded on Divine Authority (MFDA) scale, religiosity and gender) were also
included to test for potential moderation effects. Initial results suggest that
people’s moral intuitions of humans and God do diverge, and this effect was
moderated only by the MFDA scale. Limitations, implications and possible
alternative explanations are discussed.

KEYWORDS: Religion, Morality, Anthropomorphism
Ben Kok Leong Ng
September 20, 2017

GOD ON TRIAL: ARE OUR MORAL JUDGMENTS DIFFERENT BASED ON
WHETHER WE ARE JUDGING GOD OR HUMANS?

By
Ben Kok Leong Ng

Dr. Will M. Gervais
Director of Dissertation
Dr. Mark Fillmore
Director of Graduate Studies
September 20, 2017

Table of Contents
List of Figures ....................................................................................................... v
Chapter 1: Introduction ......................................................................................... 1
Psychology Of Moral Judgment ........................................................................ 3
Intentionality .................................................................................................. 4
Causality........................................................................................................ 4
Controllability ................................................................................................. 5
God As A Mindful Agent .................................................................................... 7
Divine Command Theory & Motivated Reasoning .......................................... 12
Overview Of Both Perspectives ...................................................................... 16
Pilot Study ....................................................................................................... 17
Current Study And Predictions ........................................................................ 19
Confirmatory Analyses ................................................................................ 19
Exploratory Analyses ................................................................................... 20
Morality Founded on Divine Authority Scale ................................................ 20
Religiosity .................................................................................................... 21
Gender Differences ..................................................................................... 21
Chapter 2: Methods ............................................................................................ 22
Data Collection................................................................................................ 22
Participants ..................................................................................................... 22
Initial Profile ................................................................................................. 22
Oddness Check ........................................................................................... 22
Nonbelievers ............................................................................................... 24
Final Profile ................................................................................................. 25
Skewed Gender Ratio ................................................................................. 25
Procedure ....................................................................................................... 25
Manipulations .............................................................................................. 26
Measures ........................................................................................................ 29
Dependent Variable ..................................................................................... 29
Religious Belief ............................................................................................ 29
iii

Morality Founded On Divine Authority (MFDA) ........................................... 29
Chapter 3: Results .............................................................................................. 30
Main Analyses................................................................................................. 30
Correlations..................................................................................................... 31
Exploratory MFDA Moderation Analysis ......................................................... 32
Exploratory Religious Belief Moderation Analysis ........................................... 35
Exploratory Gender Differences Moderation Analysis ..................................... 37
Chapter 4: General Discussion ........................................................................... 39
Limitations And Future Directions ................................................................... 40
Alternative Explanations ................................................................................. 46
Fear of God ................................................................................................. 46
Can God Be Anthropomorphic And Morally Perfect? .................................. 47
Implications ..................................................................................................... 50
Science vs. Religion As The Moral Authority ............................................... 50
Prejudice ..................................................................................................... 52
Moral Judgment Process ............................................................................. 53
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 54
Appendix A ......................................................................................................... 56
Appendix B ......................................................................................................... 58
Appendix C ......................................................................................................... 60
Appendix D ......................................................................................................... 62
Appendix E ......................................................................................................... 63
References ......................................................................................................... 69
VITA ................................................................................................................... 81

iv

List of Figures
Figure 1. Target x Morality of scenario interaction effect .................................... 31
Figure 2. Correlation between religiosity and MFDA scale ................................. 32
Figure 3. Three way interaction effect between target, morality of scenario and
MFDA as a moderator on moral judgment split by +/-1SD of the MFDA scale. .. 34
Figure 4. Three way interaction effect between target, morality and religiosity as
a moderator on moral judgment split by +/-1SD of religiosity. ............................ 37
Figure 5. Three way interaction effect between target, morality of scenario and
gender as a moderator on moral judgment split by males and females.............. 39

v

Chapter 1: Introduction
“Is the pious loved by the Gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is
loved by the Gods?”

Plato
The Euthyphro dilemma, a long standing question about the nature of
goodness, is a topic of contention pertinent to both the philosophy of religion and
morality. The first half of the dilemma (i.e. is the pious loved by the Gods
because it is pious) questions whether morally good acts are loved by the Gods
because they are, by nature, morally good. This perspective suggests that there
are moral standards of right and wrong independent of God’s command. The
latter half (i.e. is it pious because it is loved by the Gods) on the other hand, asks
whether an act is only morally good because it is commanded by God. Rightness
or wrongness here is based only on God’s will. Socrates’s question to Euthyphro
led various philosophers to develop numerous criticisms and possible (imperfect)
resolutions to each horn of the dilemma (e.g., Alston, 1990; Mawson, 2008).
While most of the philosophical work consists of articulating and elaborating on
how a conclusion to the dilemma can be reached, a more systematic and
empirical examination based on people’s intuitions about the dilemma is usually
absent. Sometimes philosophers may be right about people’s intuitions,
sometimes they may be wrong. Thus, empirical methods associated with
psychology when used rightly, can provide valuable data to inform research on
philosophical questions (i.e. experimental philosophy). That in no way discounts
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the converse – the contribution of philosophy to psychologically research on
human thoughts and behaviors (Gopnik & Schwitzgebel, 1998).
This paper is an examination of people’s perception of the dilemma and
more specifically, if their moral intuitions and judgments differ based on whether
they are judging God or another human. I begin by reviewing empirical research
on how people come to a moral judgment. Next, I offer two plausible competing
perspectives clarifying how people might intuit about and morally judge God.
Each perspective, in a way, represents each side of the Euthyphro dilemma. One
perspective proposes that people tend to imbue nonhuman agents such as God
with humanlike characteristics (e.g., intentions, emotions). As a result, our moral
intuitions of both God and humans should be more or less identical. If a human is
judged to be morally blameworthy for causing harm against someone else, God,
put in the exact situation, should be judged in a parallel fashion. The alternative
perspective proposes that people perceive God differently from humans. God, in
this case, is an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent supernatural agent.
This theological depiction suggests that God has sovereignty over what can be
considered morally good or bad. Humans however, are bound by God’s divine
commands. Consequently, our moral intuitions of God will be different from our
intuitions of other humans, with the effect that our moral judgments of God and
humans should diverge. While a human in this case is judged to morally
blameworthy for causing harm against someone else, God will not be morally
blamed in the exact situation.
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Psychology Of Moral Judgment
Within moral psychology, there are several models trying to explain how
moral judgments work. The information model seeks to identify the critical
elements of an agent’s behavior (e.g., agent’s causal role, intent and degree of
volition) that guide people’s moral judgments, especially in responsibility
judgments (e.g., Shaver, 1985; Weiner 1995; Cushman 2008). A subset of the
information model is the biased information model which specifies how moral
judgments can precede, rather than result from, identification of the components
required for moral judgments (e.g., Alicke, 2000). In contrast, the process models
place significant emphasis on describing the psychological processes –intuitive
and automatic or deliberate and controlled– that give rise to a moral judgment
instead of what information people seek in order to make a moral judgment (e.g.,
Haidt, 2001; Greene, 2007). More recently, an integrative model has been
proposed, taking into account both the informational and process components of
the moral judgment process (Guglielmo, 2015; Malle, Guglielmo & Monroe,
2014).
According to the integrated model, prior to making a judgment, a perceiver has to
first detect that a negative event or outcome has occurred. Detection of a
negative event is considered to be an intuitive process. The perceiver then
considers all the relevant information that can help to clarify an agent’s
involvement in the event, either via an intuitive or deliberate process, before
judgments of blameworthiness are made. However, the integrated model
proposes that the critical components are processed in a hierarchical order while
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other models see the informational components as being processed
simultaneously (e.g. Alicke, 2000). Instead of debating about which type of
processing (i.e., hierarchical vs simultaneous) makes more sense, I will consider
the critical components –intentionality, causality and controllability– that are
common to most, if not all, the models.
Intentionality
One of the most studied concepts related to attribution of blame and
responsibility is intentionality. As accurate judgments of intentionality is important
for social interactions (Carpenter, Akhtar & Tomasello, 1998), the ability to
correctly infer intentionality develops at a relatively young age (Wellman &
Phillips, 2001). Ceteris paribus, intentional acts will lead to higher degrees of
blame than unintentional ones (e.g., Darley & Shultz, 1990; Young & Saxe,
2009). However, justifiable reasons for the intentional act, such as inflicting harm
during acts of self-defense to protect oneself, may attenuate the degree of
blame.
Causality
When a negative event has been detected, there is a need to identify who
or what caused the event. If the cause is found to be natural (e.g., dying in your
sleep), blame is usually not assigned. If an agent is perceived to play a causal
role, he/she will be blamed (Shaver, 1985). When assessing causal
responsibility, however, it is not always the case that an agent is either the only
cause or not the cause at all. There are situations where multiple causes are
present or when there is uncertainty as to the exact cause of the event. In cases
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whereby multiple agents are involved, moral blame and responsibility will be
moderated according to the degree of perceived causality for each agent
(Spellman, 1997).
Controllability
The degree of personal control over an outcome is another important
aspect of blame ascription (Weiner, 1995). Moral judgments will vary according
to how much control the agent has in relation to the negative event, be it to
influence an outcome, according to one’s desire or the ability to prevent
undesirable ones. Moral transgressions due to uncontrollable impulses usually
lead to a mitigation of blame (Pizzaro, Uhlmann & Salovey, 2003).
The focus of the moral judgment process on primarily negative events and
thus moral blame, does not discount similar influences on positive events and
moral praise. However, there has been comparatively less work on the positive
side of morality. While individuals are motivated to find an agent(s) to be
responsible when a negative event occurs (Alicke, 2000), it is not known whether
individuals are similarly motivated to find an agent(s) to praise when a morally
positive event is present. For example, when someone embezzles money from a
charity organization, we want to be able to identify the person in order to shame,
blame and put him/her to jail. Conversely, someone donating the same amount
to a charity organization might garner less attention and motivation to ascertain
the person’s identity in order to praise his/her actions. One plausible explanation
for why we pay closer attention to, and processing negative events more
rigorously than positive ones, is perhaps the evolutionary advantages one can
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gain by reacting better and faster to threats than positive events (Baumeister,
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer & Vohs, 2001). A person who discounts a positive
outcome will, at the worst, experience significant regret. In contrast, a person
who ignores the threat of a negative event may die as a result of his/her
disregard. Furthermore, even when the motivation to find agents for positive
events is present, there is an asymmetry in how negative and positive events
elicit blame and praise respectively. For instance, even though a moral
transgression originating from uncontrollable impulses will lead to a mitigation of
blame, positive impulsive actions do not diminish moral praise (Pizarro, Uhlmann,
& Salovey, 2003). When it comes to intentionality, the intensified evaluation of
intentional (vs. unintentional) action is stronger for the blaming of a negative than
the praising of a positive action (Ohtsubo, 2007; Malle & Bennett, 2002). In sum,
although there are some studies showing how the effects of controllability and
intentionality can affect judgments of praise, the amount of evidence pales in
comparison to moral blame.
In conclusion, insofar as the perceiver is able to assess an agent based
on all or a combination of the critical components reviewed above, a moral
judgment can be made about the agent. While models of moral judgment are
embedded within the human context, a nonhuman agent who is perceived to
possess the requisite components can potentially be judged as if it was a
humanlike agent. In the next section, I look at how a nonhuman agent like God
can fit into the human context of moral judgment.
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God As A Mindful Agent
Mind perception, also known as theory of mind, is an important sociocognitive competency which entails ascribing mental states to others (Waytz,
Gray, Epley & Wegner, 2010). It allows us to better navigate the social world by
correctly inferring what others intent to do in a particular situation, or recognize
what others know about a situation so that we can react accordingly (e.g., if you
know that the person approaching you has the intention to rob you, you can react
by running away). Given the importance of theory of mind, it should follow a
typical developmental timeline. Consistent with this reasoning, children as young
as 18 months are able to reliably differentiate between a goal directed and
unintentional action of an adult (Meltzoff, 1995). By about 2 years of age, children
begin to describe the actions of others in terms of mental states (he went to the
bathroom because he wanted to pee) and are able to comprehend what
frustration is when people’s desires are stymied (e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1995).
A concept closely related to theory of mind is anthropomorphism. The
essence of anthropomorphism lies in our tendency to attribute humanlike
characteristics such as intentions, desires and emotions to nonhuman agents
(Epley, Waytz & Cacioppo, 2007). There are multiple pathways to
anthropomorphism. Cognitively, the accessibility of anthropomorphic knowledge
is a major determinant. Due to the lack of accessible information about
nonhuman agents, general knowledge about humans and the self serves as the
basis for generalizing properties of humans to nonhuman agents. This is
because while we hold a detailed knowledge of our own conscious experiences
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as a human, our access to that of a nonhuman agent is constrained by our
limited interactions (Epley et al, 2007). However, as we develop, we become
exposed to a wider range of nonhuman agents (e.g., computers, Gods, cars and
dogs). As we gain a deeper understanding about them, knowledge about
humans or the self will no longer be the only method of making inferences about
nonhuman agents. Instead, there will be a shared activation of information about
humans and nonhuman agents, both of which will influence the anthropomorphic
process. Therefore, the propensity to anthropomorphize should vary across the
developmental process, with its likelihood highest at the early stage. In line with
this reasoning, studies on 4 year old children across different cultures have
shown that children frequently attribute false beliefs to both humans and several
nonhuman agents, including God (Lane, Wellman & Evans, 2010; Kiessling &
Perner, 2014). By the age of 5, they become less susceptible, attributing greater
knowledge to God than to other humans (e.g., Knight Sousa, Barrett & Atran,
2003; Markris & Pnevmatikos, 2007).
Mind perception is a crucial stepping stone toward anthropomorphism
because we initially only reason about the minds of other humans (mind
perception), before extending it to nonhuman agents (anthropomorphism).
Therefore, both concepts should involve the same mental process because they
are related to how we think about others, humans and nonhumans. Indeed,
making judgments about other humans as well as making anthropomorphic
judgments about nonhuman agents involve the same neural system (Castelli,
Happe´, Frith, & Frith, 2000). Additionally, autistic people who are shown to have
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difficulty attributing mental states to agents (ToM deficits), also showed similar
deficits when reasoning about nonhuman agents (Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004).
Together, research on mind perception and anthropomorphism converge
to show that humans have a propensity to imbue nonhuman agents like God with
humanlike qualities, some of which are the critical components (e.g.,
intentionality) that shape moral judgments, as described previously. Studies on
mind perception reveal that God is rated high on agency, a dimension that
involves the capacity to plan, think and act (Gray, Gray & Wegner, 2007).
Qualities such as self-control, morality, planning and thought are part of what it
means to be agentic. All these qualities are in turn relevant for assigning moral
blame to someone. For instance, the lack of self-control can cause someone to
impulsively engage in immoral behaviors and be blamed as a result. Perception
of agency was also found to be positively and highly correlated (r=.82) with
deserving of punishment for wrongdoing (Gray et al, 2007). Therefore, the more
agency one is perceived to have, the more likely they will be blamed for a moral
transgression.
Studies on human-nonhuman interaction show similar results. For
example, when computers are credited with some form of agency, a computer
error resulted in participants blaming the computer system itself for the error
(Friedman, 1995). Likewise, when a robot named Robovie was thought to have
caused a minor moral infraction, Robovie was held partially accountable for its
actions, but significantly less so than when a human was the cause (Kahn et al,
2012). However, to the extent that a robot looks humanlike (mechanical robot vs
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humanoid robot), judgment of blame shifted closer to that of a human (Malle,
Scheutz, Forlizzi & Voiklis, 2016). This is because humanoid robots are
perceived to have greater agency based on them looking more like humans,
corroborating research on human-nonhuman interactions, and so robots are
blamed less than humans for their comparative lack of agency.
In the dehumanization literature, people also differentially attribute
uniquely human qualities (e.g., civility, rationality), a concept closely related to
agency, based on group membership. Attribution of uniquely human qualities to
different groups was found to be positively correlated with judgments of blame for
mildly immoral behaviors (e.g., making a promise and not keeping it) (Bastian,
Laham, Wilson, Haslam & Kovel, 2011). Experimentally manipulating the level of
uniquely human qualities in a target showed similar results. The target described
with more uniquely human qualities received more blame for an immoral act than
a target having less uniquely human qualities. The results are, however
inconsistent with studies on race. In a study looking at the mental association
between Blacks and ape, both White and Non-White participants primed with
Black faces were quicker to identify ape images. Furthermore, priming ape
images led to participants believing that the beating a Black suspect received
was justified (Goff, Eberhardt, Williams & Jackson, 2005). Outside of laboratory
experiments, data from actual criminal sentencing records in Pennsylvania for
1989-1992 showed that young black males are sentenced more harshly than
other groups (Steffensmeier, Ulmer & Kramer, 1998). While being perceived as
apelike should be associated with less agency and hence less moral blame and
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punishment, the opposite occurred when looking at actual sentencing records.
What could account for this discrepancy?
One issue with the paper by Bastian and colleagues (2011) is the type of
social groups presented in the correlational study and the targets used in the
experimental study. In the correlational study, groups low on unique human traits
included the mentally ill and disabled. In the experimental study, the targets were
all given names more common for Whites (e.g., Benjamin, Andrew). Both studies
did not specifically include Blacks as a comparison group. A plausible
explanation for the difference in moral blame and punishment despite Blacks, the
mentally ill and the disabled all being categorized as lower in uniquely human
qualities is the threat they are perceived to pose. For Blacks, they as often
viewed as a threat to physical safety, with the result that feelings of fear are
triggered (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Possibly, the increase in levels of
punishment and blame can serve as a form of deterrence, which concurrently
assuages their fear. The mentally ill and disabled on the other hand, are probably
not seen as a threat because of their warmth, but lack of competency, inducing
feelings of pity and sympathy (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002). In turn, level of
blame and punishment are reduced for these groups. While the agency-blame
relationship is generally robust, Blacks may be an exception rather than the
norm.
In sum, by anthropomorphizing God, we intuitively perceive God and
humans as more alike physically, mentally and perhaps even morally. Under this
perspective, both humans and God trigger similar moral intuitions when put in
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identical moral situations. Therefore, if humans can be morally blamed through
the moral judgment process for their moral actions, to the extent that God is seen
as humanlike, the same moral judgment process should extend to God for the
same actions.
Divine Command Theory & Motivated Reasoning
“We read the Ten Commandments, and I pointed out how slavery is condoned,
and we read Judges 19, a particularly heinous story about the gang rape of a
woman…For one female African American student in the class…she blurted out,
“This is the Word of God. If it says slavery is okay, it is okay. If it says rape is
okay, rape it okay.”
(Anderson, 2009, pg. 3).
Divine Command Theory (DCT), generally speaking, is the meta-ethical
theory contending that so long as we trust God’s wisdom to be perfect and His
character perfectly just, we are morally obligated to follow His commands. From
this perspective, if God forbids theft for example, no situation would justify
stealing, even if it meant saving someone from hunger. And as the incident
recounted by a Professor of the Old Testament suggests, the student’s notion of
absolute biblical authority is quintessential of DCT. How and where do people,
and religious believers more specifically, come to believe in DCT?
Underlying the acquisition of DCT beliefs, just like another other beliefs, is
social learning – defined as the learning that is influenced by our observation of
and/or interaction with another individual or individuals. There are multiple social
learning strategies a person can take advantage of in order to obtain valuable
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information important for the self (Rendell, Forgarty, Hoppitt, Morgan, Webster &
Laland, 2011). For example, people adopt the beliefs of their immediate family
(kin-based learning) because it takes fewer resources to do so as family
members are frequently within the immediate vicinity (Henrich & Henrich, 2010).
Another strategy is learning from an individual based on how successful or
prestigious he/she is, in order to increase one’s chances of success in an activity
(Henrich & Gil-White, 2001).
Therefore, people most likely learn to endorse DCT based on their early
exposure to a religious environment (e.g., family and church) that emphasizes
God’s omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenovolence. Even though there is no
direct evidence on how DCT beliefs can be passed on from one individual to
another, empirical evidence is readily available on the type of learning strategies
that can facilitate the transmission of religious beliefs. From there, we can infer
that the strategies important for transmitting religious beliefs should also extend
to DCT beliefs. After all, it is not a far cry to suggest that only a small step is
required for one to move from believing in God to believing that God’s words are
the ultimate truth.
One important strategy is kin based learning as mentioned previously.
Studies have shown how family background can influence one’s religious
development and orientation (e.g., Flor & Knapp, 2001; Hunsberger & Brown,
1984; Milevsky, Szuchman & Milevsky, 2008). The study by Flor & Knapp (2001)
for example, found that parents’ religious behavior was a significant predictor of
both adolescents’ religious behavior and the importance of religion to them. One

13

can interpret the results as suggesting that for children, parents are important
role models for the internalization of their religious beliefs and behaviors. Another
learning strategy for belief acquisition is credibility enhancing displays (CREDs)
of one’s religious beliefs (Henrich, 2009). CREDs proposes that people have a
motivation to avoid being deceived by others. Instead, we are biased toward
adopting the beliefs of individuals who back up their talk with action. For
example, an individual is more credible if he/she backs up his/her religious belief
by attending religious services regularly or performing religious rituals integral to
that religion. Insofar as people within one’s religious environment (e.g., parents,
religious leaders and members) practice what they preach, one is more like to
adopt those beliefs. Consistent with CREDs as a learning strategy, exposure to
credible religious displays predicted the acquisition of religious beliefs (Lanman,
2012; Lanman & Buhrmester, 2017). With respect to DCT beliefs, if people within
one’s religious environment, and especially religious leaders, can credibly display
any form of behavior in line DCT beliefs (e.g., Never lying because God says it is
wrong), one is more likely to also endorse that belief and live by it.
Once people start adopting DCT beliefs, additional psychological benefits
may follow. God’s divine commands provide a prescriptive roadmap of the moral
rules to follow in order to lead a moral life (Silberman, 2005). With unambiguous
moral rules people can better master their surroundings, making them feel in
control. Consistent with this reasoning, research has shown that religious belief is
associated with a sense of control and order (e.g., Inzlicht, McGregor, Hirsh &
Nash, 2009; Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan & Laurin, 2008). This personal sense
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of control has a positive impact on our wellbeing, both physical and psychological
(Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Thus, people may obtain positive benefits by endorsing
DCT as a moral worldview that empowers them with feelings of control.
However, when their DCT belief is threatened by conflicting information,
people may start engaging in motivated reasoning in order to restore control.
Motivated reasoning describes how individuals have a tendency to converge on
their assessment of relevant information about an event, or person, in order to
reach a preferred and predetermined conclusion (Kunda, 1990; Ditto, Pizzaro &
Tannenbaum, 2009). When the conclusion is germane to morality (e.g., God is
perfectly morally good and so are His commands), information and beliefs
relevant to moral judgments may be differentially processed, reinterpreted and
justified in order to support this preferred and predetermined moral conclusion
about God. For instance, presenting people with information that God should be
blamed for causing a negative event, will trigger a motivation to generate moral
arguments in defense of God and their DCT belief.
Suppose one is provided with information that God allowed an avalanche
that subsequently killed a person. Following from the criteria for judgments of
blame, God should be responsible because 1) the avalanche was intentionally
allowed to take place 2) God was the agent indirectly causing it and 3) the allpowerful God could have easily prevented the avalanche but failed to do so.
However, because this scenario conflicts with our desired conclusion of God and
DCT, motivated reasoning is activated. Here, I consider two plausible arguments
in defense of God’s morality and DCT 1) “God intended for this avalanche to
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happen in order to prevent a greater harm from happening” – greater good
hypothesis. The conclusion is protected because God’s intentions and actions
are interpreted to be inherently good. This form of justification has an added
psychological advantage of being unfalsifiable (i.e. we cannot test the greater
good hypothesis), allowing believers to maintain or even strength their DCT
beliefs (Friesen, Campbell & Kay, 2014). 2) “The person who died must have
died for a reason. He must have done something wrong to deserve it”. This
argument is similar to the idea of victim blaming in rape cases. People blame the
victim because innocent victims are a threat to our just world beliefs (Lerner &
Miller, 1978). Likewise, blaming the victim here protects believers’ DCT beliefs by
arguing that it is only right to punish those who deserve it.
In sum, this perspective proposes that when our DCT belief is threatened,
people will be motivated to protect their desired and predetermined conclusion
about God. As a result, people become more flexible in reassessing and
justifying the disconfirming information that may be indicative of God’s
immorality. Eventually, moral judgments of God will adhere to DCT with the effect
that God’s moral goodness is upheld.
Overview Of Both Perspectives
The distinction made between each account about people’s moral
intuitions of God will lead to divergent predictions; for people who
anthropomorphize God, their moral intuitions of God and humans are highly
identical. As a result, the critical elements that shape moral judgments for
humans (i.e., intentionality, causality and control) will be assessed equally for
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God. Consequently, judgments of moral blame and responsibility for God will
converge with judgments for other humans in the event of a moral transgression.
For people with a belief in DCT, their moral intuitions of God and humans will
bifurcate. Thus, the moral judgment process will remain relevant for humans, but
it should not apply to God. Instead, moral judgments will be based on a
predetermined version of a morally perfect God. Accordingly, God will be
absolved of blame for a moral transgression, but humans will assume moral
responsibility based on evaluation of their intentionality, causality and
controllability. There should not be any difference in moral judgments for both
accounts when the event is morally good.
Pilot Study
A pilot study was conducted as an initial investigation of the two
competing accounts and their predictions. Three hundred and ninety students
from the University of Kentucky participated in this study. Research in moral
psychology uses the trolley problem as a moral dilemma to investigate how moral
judgments work. In the typical trolley problem, participants are told that a train is
approaching a footbridge out of control with 5 people on the track. A heavy
weight can be dropped onto the track to stop the train and as it happens, there is
a large man on the bridge. In the utilitarian condition, the target decides to push
the large man over to stop the train, killing him in order to save 5 lives. In the
deontological condition, the target refrained from pushing the large, letting the 5
die. Research has shown that a majority of the participants rated the target as
less moral in the utilitarian condition compared to the deontological condition. In
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the pilot study, the human target was swapped for God, keeping everything else
the same.
Results using Bayesian analyses are consistent with the DCT account.
When asked to rate the morality of God's actions in the trolley problem in which
five lives can be saved by pushing one man in front of a speeding trolley -an
action typically seen as less moral than simply letting the trolley run its courseparticipants rated God as equally moral regardless of whether or not He
sacrificed one life to save five.
Using the trolley problem as a stimulus to examine moral judgments is not
without problems. One of the most glaring methodological issues pertains to
external validity. External validity refers to how well the effect found in a study
can be generalized to other situations and the population of interest. Arguments
with regards to low external validity stems from empirical studies showing that
the trolley problem 1) is perceived as being non serious or even humorous rather
than sobering. When a situation contains elements of humor, the decision
making process associated with judgments of morality may be altered (Rozin &
Royzman, 2001) 2) is unrealistic with respect to the moral situations one might
encounter in real life (Bennis, Medin & Bartels, 2010). For example, participants
may be suspicious of how the large man is actually able to stop the train and 3)
because of the unrealistic nature, the trolley problem may not activate the same
psychological processes as a more realistic moral situation (Bauman, McGraw,
Bartels, Warren, 2014). Due to issues of external validity arising from the trolley
problem, I attempted to create more realistic moral scenarios in the current study

18

in order to allow us to increase the generalizability of the findings. Additionally,
although the pilot study was a comparison of the push and not push scenarios, a
human target was not included. This means that the pilot study is restricted to
only testing patterns of moral judgment across the moral and immoral scenarios
for God. By including a human target in the current study, a comparison between
God and the human target can be more explicitly made in order to examine if the
patterns of moral judgments differ not just according to the morality of the
scenario but also between both agents.
Current Study And Predictions
Confirmatory Analyses
The current study is a 2 (Target: human vs God) x 2 (Morality of scenario:
moral vs immoral) x 3 (Scenarios: sexual assault vs robbery vs murder) mixed
model design. From the anthropomorphic God perspective, patterns of judgment
for the human and God targets will be similar for both the moral and immoral
conditions. That is, moral judgments of humans and God will be equally high in
the moral condition across scenarios but equally low in the immoral condition. In
this case, only the main effect of the morality variable will be significant. For the
DCT perspective, moral judgments of humans and God will be also be equally
high in the moral condition. However, there will be a significant interaction effect
between target and morality, such that God will be rated as highly moral in the
immoral condition but humans will be rated as highly immoral. Since the pilot
study provided initial evidence for the DCT perspective, I hypothesize that there
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will be a significant interaction effect between target and morality. However, I am
agnostic about whether moral judgments will vary across the moral scenarios.
Exploratory Analyses
The main reason why all other analyses are exploratory other than the
main interaction effect is the sample size of the study. According to Simonsohn’s
(2014, blogpost), if an initial study has a total of 100 participants for a simple two
cell design (n=50 per cell), then study two which typical is a 2 x 2 design requires
at least 50 x 2 x 4 = 400 participants. With a three way interaction, a minimum of
1600 participants are needed. Based on this mathematical derived logic, I initially
intended to collect data for 400 participants in order to examine the 2 x 2 design
that I proposed. Only one moderator (i.e., morality founded on divine authority)
was added, and additionally as an exploratory, instead of confirmatory, variable
due to the immense number of participants needed. Even with just one
moderator variable, the already smaller than expected sample size (expected
400 vs actual 280) makes any moderation analysis less than ideal. As it
happens, even if power is just 20%, 1 out of 5 studies will work (Simonsohn,
2014) but the results will not be meaningful. Although the committee members
suggested that an anthropomorphism scale be added, after careful consideration,
I decided against it because small studies with multiple variables have higher
chances of obtaining type 1 error (Ioannidis, 2005).
Morality Founded on Divine Authority Scale
An exploratory analysis looking at participants’ belief that morality is
founded on divine authority (Piazza & Landy, 2013) will be included as a
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moderator. This scale measures how much participants believe that God’s
commands are divine, morally true and to be followed. MFDA beliefs should
moderate the interaction effects such that participants who are +1SD in MFDA
beliefs will rate God as more moral than humans in the immoral condition but
there will be no effect for people who are -1SD in MFDA beliefs. At this moment,
only one paper has validated the measure, so there is limited evidence
examining its convergent and divergent validity. Therefore, the scale was
included as an exploratory variable because, at this stage, there is insufficient
evidence to propose that the moderation analysis be confirmatory.
Religiosity
To the extent that religiosity is correlated with MFDA beliefs, we should
also expect that religiosity should moderate the interaction effect such that
participants who are +1SD in religiosity will rate God as more moral than humans
in the immoral condition but there will be effect for people who are -1SD in
religiosity.
Gender Differences
All analyses looking at gender differences will be considered exploratory
because there were no a priori hypotheses about gender differences in this
study. Gender differences as a moderator was added primarily due to the
skewed gender ratio.
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Chapter 2: Methods
Data Collection
My initial aim was to collect four hundred participants for the study to
ensure that there will be at least one hundred participants per condition for the
main 2 x 2 design analysis. Data collection started in February and ended the
first week of April. However, due to the fact that the subject pool tends to be
smaller during the spring semester, I was unable to achieve my target of four
hundred participants.
Participants
Initial Profile
A total of two hundred and eighty students from the University of Kentucky
initially participated in the study for course credit. Sixty three were males, two
hundred and sixteen were females and 1 participant did not indicate the gender.
Participants ranged from 18 to 25 years old (M = 19.08, SD = 1.11). The religious
composition is as follows; 81.1% Christians, 1.1% Hindu, 2.9% Muslim, 6.8%
none, 2.9% Atheist, 5% Agnostic and 0.4% did not indicate a religion.
Oddness Check
At the end of the survey, participants were asked in general terms “Did
anything seem odd about this study”. This was meant as an oddness check for
the moral scenarios. Despite my best efforts to ensure that the moral scenarios
are as realistic as possible, reservations about their realism would undoubtedly
be raised by some participants. The potential problem with explicitly stated
reservations from participants is whether it might affect their moral judgment
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process. Granted, it is also possible that other participants had the same
thoughts but did not state them in the check question. However, having college
students explicitly state their reservations about the scenarios for an online
psychology survey probably meant that some minimum threshold of realism has
been violated. With that in mind, if participants explicitly stated, one way or
another, that they found the scenarios to be sufficiently odd or unrealistic, they
were removed from the analyses. For instance, one participant who was
excluded wrote that “The scenarios seemed odd”. Based on my subjective
judgment, a total of seven participants were removed from the analyses.
Furthermore, after going through the oddness check question, I decided to
also remove participants from analyses if they thought the study might be
defending/attacking atheism, God or religion. This might potentially result in a
contrast effect whereby participants either intensify or diminish their moral
judgment ratings to defend their stand on the issue. For example, if religious
participants felt that the scenarios were an attack on God, they might defend God
by rating God even more moral than they normally would. Based on my
subjective judgment, 2 participants were removed from the analyses.
At the end of the survey, a suspicion question “Please speculate what you
think this study was about” was included to examine whether participants were
able to correctly infer the study’s hypothesis. Going through the suspicion
question, a majority of the participants were at least able to say that the study is
about God/religion and morality. Some participants’ speculations were more
precise, stating that “this study was about whether or not God provides humans
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with moral laws or if they are naturally just a part of us”. However, even if
participants were able to accurately infer the research hypothesis, issues
associated with demand characteristics should be unlikely. It seems unlikely that
participants –theists or atheists– would modify their personal moral judgments
based on the purpose of the study. Therefore, participants who correctly inferred
the purpose of the research study were not removed from the analyses.
Nonbelievers
Nonbelievers in this sample were participants who indicated as either
none or atheist in the demographic question on their religion. A total of only
twenty seven participants fell into this category because students in the
University of Kentucky are more likely to be religious than not. During the
recruitment process, there was no explicit intention to filter out nonbelievers
because the study is interested in people’s moral judgments, not just believers’.
Additionally, because the proportion of nonbelievers in the University of Kentucky
is relatively small, actively recruiting nonbelievers for the purpose of statistical
comparison is going to take a lot of resources. However, even if a comparison is
not feasible, including nonbelievers will give the study the full range of religiosity
to work with. By including nonbelievers, any moderation effects due to religiosity
can be explored more appropriately. This can give us some clue, however little,
as to how a variation in religiosity might be associated with moral judgments of
God. Hence, nonbelievers were not removed from the final the analyses.
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Final Profile
A total of nine participants were removed from the sample, leaving two
hundred and seventy one participants for analyses. Sixty one were males, two
hundred and nine were females and 1 participant did not indicate the gender.
Participants ranged from 18 to 25 years old (M = 19.07, SD = 1.12). The religious
composition is as follows; 81.5% Christians, 0.7% Hindu, 3.0% Muslim, 6.6%
none, 2.6% Atheist, 5.2% Agnostic and 0.4% did not indicate a religion.
Skewed Gender Ratio
As noted above, only sixty one or 22.5% of the participants were males.
This is likely because the subject pool consists mainly of students from the
psychology department and a large proportion of the students in psychology are
females. Therefore, the results of the study may be more generalizable to
females than males. With the skewed gender ratio, additional analyses by gender
will be conducted to check for any potential gender differences.
Procedure
Participants who signed up for the online study were given an online link
which they could use to complete the survey at any time. At the start of the
survey, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. For
each condition, participants read 3 scenarios, randomly ordered, and then
answered a four item scale used as the dependent measure. Participants then
completed a 20 item scale measuring their belief that morality is founded on
divine authority (MFDA). The survey ended with basic demographic information
and a suspicion check question.
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Manipulations
Moral Scenarios
3 different moral scenarios were created for the purpose of this study. In
order to increase external validity that the pilot study lacked, I attempted to create
scenarios that sounded more realistic and had a higher chance of occurring in
real life than the trolley problem. The scenarios I decided on were related to
sexual assault, robbery and murder. All of the scenarios are situations that
people can and do face in real life, making them potentially more relatable when
having to make moral judgments about them. Even if participants have not
personally experienced any of the moral situations, they are common news in the
media, thereby increasing their mundane realism compared to the trolley
problem. Furthermore, each scenario is associated with a different moral
transgression so that effects can be better generalized to other situations and not
limited to a specific moral transgression. Lastly, the moral scenarios are some of
the most unambiguous in terms of their moral wrongness, hence they are more
salient and harder to ignore when making a moral judgment, compared to the
trolley problem.
Due to the complex nature of the study, tradeoffs had to be made in the
process of creating the moral scenarios. One of the difficulties in this study was
how the scenarios must not only be as realistic as possible but remain so even
when both the humans and God targets are substituted with each other.
However, a God target intervening in human specific events will invariably tend to
be harder to imagine for participants. For that reason, my starting point was to
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focus on generating moral scenarios that a human target can behave both
morally and immorally in, before ensuring that it will still sound sufficiently
acceptable when replaced with a God target. Furthermore, it is likely that
describing an action in the scenarios can induce participants to think of God in an
anthropomorphic way. Therefore, instead of describing how the pedestrian/God
acted morally or immorally (e.g., hit the man with a metal rod), I simply described
the target as intervening or not in the vignette to minimize the chances that
participants will think about God in anthropomorphic terms. In the case of an
avalanche killing someone, the major problem was in the moral human condition.
Given the potential catastrophic effects of an avalanche, it is hard to imagine how
a single person could have the ability to act morally to save someone from dying
in an avalanche. Even if it was possible to describe how “the victim was dug out
of the snow” after the fact, using that description would increase the chances of
triggering an anthropomorphic version of God in participants. Similarly, replacing
the above description “with intervening to save the victim in the avalanche” for
the human condition, sounds less plausible than intervening to save the victim of
a sexual assault, robbery or murder. There are more ways to imagine how a
person can save a potential victim of sexual assault than a person caught in an
avalanche. Therefore, with the human target as my starting point for creation of
the scenarios, as well as with minimizing thoughts of anthropomorphic God in
participants as the priority, the avalanche scenario was not used. The wording for
each scenario is described below:
Sexual Assault
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“A young woman was walking through a dark alley late one night when a man
suddenly stopped her in her footsteps. He first offered her cash in return for
some sexual favors. When she refused, he attempted to sexually assault her.”
Robbery
“A woman was opening the door to her house when suddenly a man jumped out
behind the bushes. He held the knife by her throat and ordered her to surrender
her purse.”
Murder
“A man was driving home from work late one night through a bad neighborhood.
He pulled his car into an alley where nobody would see it. He got out of the car
and walked over to where a homeless woman was sleeping. He pulled out his
knife in an attempt to stab the woman.”
Following the general description, in the moral conditions, the target (God
or human) decided to intervene; “God decided to intervene” or “A pedestrian was
passing by and decided to intervene.” In the immoral conditions, the target
decided not to do anything; “God could have intervened but did not do so.” or “A
pedestrian was nearby and could have intervened but did not do so”.
In the moral conditions, intervention always led to a good outcome such
as “The woman was saved from being sexually assaulted by the man.” In the
immoral conditions, inaction always led to a bad outcome such as “The man
stabbed the woman the death.”
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Measures
Dependent Variable
After reading each scenario, participants rated on 1 (Not at all) to 7 (To a
very large extent) Likert scale a 4 item scale measuring the morality of the target.
The items are 1) To what extent is God/the pedestrian moral 2) To what extent is
it morally permissible for God to act this way 3) To what extent should God be
morally blamed (reversed coded) and 4) To what extent does God have good
moral standards. The Cronbach’s Alpha for the sexual assault, robbery and
murder scenarios were .861, .822 and .842 respectively. Reliability was high and
so no items were removed before analyses. The table of means and standard
deviations can be found in Appendix A for the moral scenarios.
Religious Belief
Participants were asked on a scale of 0-100 how strongly they believe in
God or Gods. They were told to indicate a 0 if they are certain that God or Gods
does not exist and a 100 if they are certain that God or Gods does exist.
Morality Founded On Divine Authority (MFDA)
The MFDA is a 20 item scale adopted from Piazza and Landy (2013). This
scale is used as a measure of the extent to which participants believed that moral
truths are dependent on God. Examples of items in the scale include “The truth
about morality is revealed only by God”, “The way to live a moral life is revealed
to us by God through Holy Scripture” and “Acts that are immoral are immoral
because God forbids them.” For the MFDA scale, α = .962. Reliability was high
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and so no items were removed before analyses. Refer to Appendix B for the full
scale.
Chapter 3: Results
Main Analyses
A 2 (Target: human vs God) x 2 (Morality of scenario: moral vs immoral) x
3 (Scenario: sexual assault vs robbery vs murder), mixed model ANOVA with
target and morality as between subjects and scenario as within subjects revealed
that there were no significant differences across scenarios. Therefore, the three
scenarios were collapsed into a 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVA analysis.
A 2 (Target: human vs God) x 2 (Morality of scenario: moral vs immoral)
ANOVA was conducted to examine the effects of target and morality of scenario
on moral judgment. Results suggested a main effect for target, F(1, 267) =
39.795, p < .001, ηp2 = .130, Mhuman = 4.52, SDhuman = 1.94, MGod = 5.49, SDGod =
1.43 and morality of scenario, F(1, 267) = 184.915, p < .001, ηp2 = .409, Mmoral =
6.01, SDmoral = 1.08, Mimmoral = 3.97, SDimmoral = 1.74 on moral judgments. Both
the main effects were however qualified by a significant target by morality of
scenario interaction effect, F(1, 267) = 79.585, p < .001, ηp2 = .223. The table of
means for the interaction can be found in Appendix C.
In order to clarify the interaction effects, a simple main effects analysis
was conducted. Results showed that for the condition where scenarios are moral,
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there was no difference in moral
judgments for the human and God target, F(1, 267) = 3.020, p = .083. However
in the condition where scenarios are immoral, moral judgment of God was
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significantly higher than for the human target F(1, 267) = 112.140, p < .001.
Therefore, participants are more likely to judge God to be more moral than a
human target even when both targets did not intervene when the scenarios are
immoral.
Figure 1. Target x Morality of scenario interaction effect
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Bar graph represents the target by morality of scenario interaction effect. Error bars represent
CIs

Correlations
A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to
assess the relationship between MFDA and religiosity. Results showed that there
was a positive correlation, r = 0.703, n = 270, p < 0.01. Participants higher in
MFDA beliefs tend to also be higher in religiosity. Point-biserial correlations were
ran to determine the relationship between gender and religiosity as well as
gender and MFDA beliefs. No significant relationships were found for gender and
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religiosity (rpb = .019, n = 268, p = .753) or gender and MFDA beliefs (rpb = .047, n
= 270, p = .442).
Figure 2. Correlation between religiosity and MFDA scale

Exploratory MFDA Moderation Analysis
Using PROCESS SPSS Model 3 with a bootstrapping sample of 10000
(Hayes, 2012), I conducted a test for the main effects of target, morality of
scenario and MFDA (mean-centered), as well the interaction effects between
target, morality of scenario and MFDA on moral judgment.
There was significant main effect of target on moral judgment, b = .833,
95% CI [.562, 1.105], SE = .138, t = 6.045, p < .001. The main effects of both
morality of scenario, b = -2.063, 95% CI [-2.335, -1.791], SE = .138, t = -14.926,
p < .001 and MFDA, b = .275, 95% CI [.184, .365], SE = .046, t = 5.960, p < .001
on moral judgment were also significant. However, this was qualified by a
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significant three way interaction of target, morality of scenario and MFDA on
moral judgment, b = .419, 95% CI [.054, .783], SE = .185, t = 2.263, p = .024.
To further interpret the significant moderating effect, several different
analytical procedures were carried out (Aiken & West, 1991). I first tested the
significance of the effect of target (0 = human, 1 = God) on moral judgment at
different combinations of high (1 SD above the mean) and low (1 SD below the
mean) MFDA and morality (0 = moral, 1 = immoral). When MFDA was at -1 SD,
there was a significant conditional effect of target in the moral scenarios, b = .823, 95% CI [-1.356, -.291], SE = .270, t = -3.045, p = .003, as well as a
significant conditional effect of target in the immoral scenarios, b = .986, 95% CI
[.325, 1.646], SE = .335, t = 2.940, p = .004). When MFDA was at +1 SD, there
was no significant conditional effect of target in the moral scenarios, b = .098, p =
.635, but there was a significant conditional effect of target in the immoral
scenarios, b = 3.145, 95% CI [2.609, 3.681], SE = .272, t = 11.551, p < .001.
Second, I tested the significance of conditional effects of the interaction between
target and morality of scenario at both +/-1 SD of the MFDA. Results indicated
that there were significant conditional interaction effects at both -1SD, b = 1.809,
95% CI [.961, 2.657], SE = .431, t = 4.200, p < .001, and +1SD, b = 3.046, 95%
CI [2.376, 3.720], SE = .342, t = 8.915, p < .001, of the MFDA. The table of
means for the interaction can be found in Appendix C.
Regardless of whether participants were high or low in MFDA, they rated
God higher in morality than humans for the immoral scenarios. However, the
effect was weaker when MFDA was low (-1 SD) but stronger when MFDA was
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high (+1 SD), as can be seen by the steeper slope coefficient when MFDA was
high (b = 3.145) compared to low (b = .986).
Figure 3. Three way interaction effect between target, morality of scenario and
MFDA as a moderator on moral judgment split by +/-1SD of the MFDA scale.
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Immoral

Exploratory Religious Belief Moderation Analysis
Using PROCESS SPSS Model 3 with a bootstrapping sample of 10000, I
again conducted another test for the main effects of target, morality of scenario
and religiosity (mean-centered), as well the interaction effects between target,
morality scenario and religiosity on moral judgment.
There was significant main effect of target on moral judgment, b = .838,
95% CI [.583, 1.092], SE = .129, t = 6.479, p < .001. The main effects of both
morality of scenario, b = -2.085, 95% CI [-2.341, -1.830], SE = .130, t = -16.067,
p < .001 and religiosity, b = .015, 95% CI [.011, .020], SE = .002, t = 6.230, p <
.001 on moral judgment were also significant. However, the three way interaction
of target, morality of scenario and religiosity on moral judgment was not
significant, b = .014, 95% CI [-.005, .033], SE = .010, t = 1.418, p = .157.
Even though the three way interaction was not significant, I further tested
the conditional effects in order to gain some insights. I first tested the significance
of the effect of target (0 = human, 1 = God) on moral judgment at different
combinations of high (1 SD above the mean) and low (1 SD below the mean)
religiosity and morality of scenario (0 = moral, 1 = immoral). When religiosity was
at -1 SD, there was a significant conditional effect of target in the moral
scenarios, b = -1.182, 95% CI [-1.683, -.681], SE = .254, t = -4.648, p < .001, as
well as a significant conditional effect of target in the immoral scenarios, b = .914,
95% CI [.279, 1.549], SE = .322, t = 2.834, p = .005. When religiosity was at +1
SD, there was no significant conditional effect of target in the moral scenarios, b
= .149, p = .433, but there was a significant conditional effect of target in the
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immoral scenarios, b = 2.924, 95% CI [2.462, 3.386], SE = .235, t = 12.464, p <
.001. The table of means for the interaction can be found in Appendix C.
Regardless of whether participants were high or low in religiosity, they
rated God higher in morality than humans in the immoral scenarios. However, the
effect was weaker when religiosity was low (-1 SD) but stronger when religiosity
was high (+1 SD), as can be seen by the steeper slope coefficient when
religiosity was high (b = 2.924) compared to low (b = .914). This pattern of results
closely mirrored the moderation results for MFDA beliefs even though the three
way interaction in this case was not significant. The small sample size could have
led to power issues to detect the effect. Further, even though the correlation
between MFDA beliefs and religiosity was significant, the strength of association
was only moderately strong. To the extent that MFDA beliefs do not map fully
onto religiosity, the moderation effect of religiosity may be smaller, further
compounded by power issues, leading to non-significant findings.
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Figure 4. Three way interaction effect between target, morality and religiosity
as a moderator on moral judgment split by +/-1SD of religiosity.
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Error bars represent standard error.

Exploratory Gender Differences Moderation Analysis
Using PROCESS SPSS Model 3 with a bootstrapping sample of 10000, I
conducted another test for the main effects of target, morality of scenario and
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gender, as well the interaction effects between target, morality of scenario and
gender on moral judgment.
There was significant main effect of target on moral judgment, b = .915,
95% CI [.616, 1.213], SE = .152, t = 6.031, p < .001. Although main effect of
morality of scenario on moral judgment was significant, b = -1.999, 95% CI [2.299, -1.700], SE = .152, t = -13.134, p < .001, gender was not, b = .006, p =
.975. The three way interaction of target, morality of scenario and gender on
moral judgment was also not significant, b = .074, p = .918.
Even though the three way interaction was not significant, I further tested
the conditional effects in order to gain some insights. I first tested the significance
of the effect of target (0 = human, 1 = God) on moral judgment at different
combinations of high (1 SD above the mean) and low (1 SD below the mean)
morality of scenario and gender (1 = male, 2 = female). For males, although
there was no conditional effect of target in the moral scenarios, b = -.397, p =
.347, there was a significant conditional effect of target in the immoral scenarios,
b = 2.145, 95% CI [1.214, 3.076], SE = .473, t = 4.526, p < .001. For females,
there was no significant conditional effect of target in the moral scenarios, b = .356, p = .086, but there was a significant conditional effect of target in the
immoral scenarios, b = 2.259, 95% CI [1.710, 2.809], SE = .279, t = 8.10, p <
.001. Overall, both males and females showed similar patterns of moral judgment
across target and morality of scenario. The table of means for the interaction can
be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 5. Three way interaction effect between target, morality of scenario and
gender as a moderator on moral judgment split by males and females.
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Chapter 4: General Discussion
The goal of this research study was to examine people’s intuitions about
the Euthyphro dilemma, and more specifically, testing two competing hypotheses
as they relate to each horn of the dilemma. The first hypothesis suggests that
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because people tend to anthropomorphize God, their moral intuitions of humans
and God will overlap such that patterns of moral judgments of both targets will be
similar. The second hypothesis suggests that because people belief in God’s
divine commands, when faced with conflicting information about God’s morality,
people will generate arguments in order to protect their predetermined version of
God as morally good. Consequently, patterns of moral judgment will differ when
judging human versus judging God. Results of the main confirmatory interaction
effect supported the latter hypothesis.
When the target was God, moral judgments were significantly more
positive compared to a human target when the scenarios presented were
immoral. There was no difference in moral judgment when the scenarios
presented were moral. Results are consistent with the pilot study, providing
further support that our moral intuition and hence judgment of God is different
when compared to moral judgment of a human target.
Furthermore, the exploratory MFDA variable also moderated this effect,
with participants +1SD in their MFDA score rating God’s morality higher than the
human target when presented with immoral scenarios. This effect however, was
attenuated but still significant for people -1SD in their MFDA score. Both
exploratory analyses of religiosity and gender did not reveal any significant
moderation effects.
Limitations And Future Directions
External validity is an important component of psychological inquiry
because it allows us to generalize the findings of our study to other groups of
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participants and settings not present in the current experiment. While efforts have
been made to ensure that the moral scenarios constructed in the current study
are more realistic than the trolley problem, the scenarios are imperfect and this
not immune from threats to external validity. As mentioned previously, even
though participants who explicitly questioned the realism of the scenarios in the
check question were removed from analyses, this does not necessarily mean
that the rest of the participants do not have similar concerns. In the sexual
assault scenario for example, participants could be unsure as to why a young
woman would walk through the dark alley by herself. Similarly, participants may
be confused as to why a man who was driving home from work would suddenly
pull up his car and attempt to stab someone for no apparent reason. Even though
sexual assault and murder are events that do happen in real life, the way they
are described in the current study may not have made as much sense to the
participants. Therefore, at least two of the scenarios may have lacked external
validity due to low mundane realism - the extent to which the experimental events
resemble situations people are likely to encounter outside of the laboratory
(Aronson, Wilson & Brewer, 1998). One way of overcoming this issue in the
future is to have either a group of research assistants or a small pool of
participants pre-rate a set of moral scenarios (just like how pictures are pre-rated
for their attractiveness in some studies) for their realism and coherence. The
moral scenarios can then be filtered and chosen according to their ratings. This
way, one of the threats to external validity can be minimized.
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Other than mundane realism, there is also the potential issue of
generalizability, across both context and people. The omission bias, whereby
harm caused by action is morally worse than equivalent harm caused by
omission, is a well-established finding in moral psychology (e.g., Spranca, Minsk
& Baron, 1991; Young, Cushman & Hauser, 2006). For the immoral scenarios in
the study, they were phrased in a way that only described how the targets failed
to offer any form of help to the victim. Reading about how the target omitted help
could be psychologically different from reading about a target actively engaging
in a misdeed. Therefore, the current study is limited by the fact that we are
unable to generalizable the findings to others immoral scenarios whereby both
targets are trying to harm someone, instead of merely refraining from helping the
victims. Additionally, our study used only a convenient student sample from the
University of Kentucky instead of sampling from a larger community of older
participants outside of the University. While convenience sampling is cheap and
easy to manage, it can lead to an under representation of certain groups in the
sample. This puts a limit on our ability to generalize the findings because the
sample is not representative of the population being studied.
A recent approach in moral psychology has conceptualized morality within
a framework of five basic domains of moral concern: harm/care, fairness,
authority, ingroup loyalty, and purity – moral foundations theory (Haidt & Joseph,
2007; Shweder, Mahapatra & Miller, 1997). The domain of harm/care as the
name implies, is concerned with protecting others because of our dislike of pain.
Fairness is related to ideas of justice, rights and autonomy based in reciprocity.
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Authority is our deference to legitimate authority, shaped by the hierarchical
nature of our social interaction. Loyalty refers to us standing by our ingroup (e.g.,
ethnicity, religion, nation etc). Lastly, purity is concerned with things, actions or
food that are disgusting. While the moral scenarios in the study involved different
types of moral transgressions (i.e., sexual assault, robbery and murder), it is
limited by its emphasis on only harm based stimuli. Relying only on stimuli that
share similar characteristics (i.e., harm based) can limit external validity because
we cannot determine whether or how common aspects of the stimuli might
influence the findings of the study (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Some of the moral
domains within the moral foundations framework may trigger moral cognitions
different from the harm based scenarios found in the study while others may
share similar patterns.
Other than the fact that the moral scenarios were all harm based, they
were also impersonal, such that participants read the vignettes from a third party
perspective without any form of personal involvement in the moral scenarios.
Recently, a series of studies conducted by Exline, Park, Smyth & Carey (2011)
instead had participants think about and write down a negative event from their
lives where they or someone close to them experienced some form of harm or
unfairness. In addition, only a negative event that led spontaneously to attribution
of responsibility to God can be included. Results generally showed that
participants reported both anger and positive emotions toward God for the
negative event, although more positive emotions were reported than anger.
Furthermore, in study 3, path model analysis revealed that belief in divine
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intervention predicted attribution of responsibility to God. The severity of the
harm from the negative event also predicted attribution of responsibility to God.
In study 4, the negative event was in the context of bereavement. In that
particular study, the most common causes of death reported by participants was
cancer (36%), heart disease (11%) and accidents (9%). In all these cases where
finding a human perpetrator to blame for their loss would be difficult, the next
best alternative is to blame God because God is the entity that has ability to
shoulder all responsibilities when none can be found (Gray & Wegner, 2010). In
the current studies however, participants were not personally involved in the
moral scenarios and there was a human agent (the perpetrator) in the scenario
they could blame. Hence, it is possible that the omission of these variables could
have influenced their moral judgments of God.
Another limitation is how the present study did not assess the justifications
of the participants for their moral judgments. This is especially important for the
DCT perspective because the central argument is that people are motivated to
justify God’s actions in order to preserve God’s moral goodness. Theoretically, it
is this justification motivation for God that is lacking for the human target during
moral judgments that immunizes God from moral blame. As the current study
only measured the final outcome of participant’s moral judgment, motivated
reasoning is inferred based on their moral judgment results. In order to provide
stronger evidence that motivated reasoning played a role in the moral judgment
process, the study design could have employed measures that asks participants
to provide justifications for their answers.
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Having sufficient power is important to detect an effect. When power is low
however, the negative consequences can be dire (e.g., Cohen, 1962). For
example, low power makes it harder for researchers to detect an effect when it
exists (e.g., Cohen, 1992) and inflate Type I error (e.g., Ioanndis, 2005). As
noted previously, my initial desired sample size was at least four hundred
participants for a 2 by 2 factorial design. That makes one hundred participants
per condition, which is much larger than the usual sample size in social
psychology (approx. 25), giving us sufficient power to detect even small effects.
However, the spring semester tends to have a smaller subject pool, resulting in a
final sample of only two hundred and seventy one participants. Therefore, even
though I found the hypothesized interaction effect and a moderation effect, the
small sample size could have inflated Type I error, meaning that one or both
effects could be false positives.
Last but not least, the current study only used self-report measures to
examine participant’s moral judgment. Self-report measures can be highly
inaccurate because, oftentimes, we may not have the introspective ability to
provide an accurate answer to the question, despite our best efforts to be honest.
Additionally, there is the issue of socially desirable responding. Participants may
give moral ratings that are in line with their religious beliefs in order to present
and maintain a certain image of themselves to others. One way of overcoming
the limits of self-report measures is to employ implicit measures to get at
participant’s moral judgment ratings. However, current implicit paradigms such as
the Implication Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1988) and the

45

Affect Misattribution Procedure (Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005) do
not measure moral judgments, but rather the speed of associations and
proportion of pleasant/unpleasant judgments respectively. Nonetheless,
Cameron and colleagues (2016) recently developed a new approach to implicitly
measure people’s evaluation of the wrongness of actions or people. This new
approach can potentially be used in future studies to corroborate with current
self-report measures of participants’ moral judgment ratings.
Alternative Explanations
Fear of God
While Divine Command Theory fits as an explanation for why participants
judged the morality of a human target and God different, particularly in the
immoral scenarios, the current study is unable to rule out an alternative
explanation – fear of punishment from God. This perspective stems from an
adaptationist approach to religious belief whereby religion is viewed as an
adaption for navigating the challenges associated with group cooperation. To be
successful at living and cooperating as a group is an evolutionary challenge
because of the costly investments required from group members. Free-riders are
especially dangerous because they can leech the benefits without contributing
resources to the group (Sober & Wilson, 1999). However, believing in a
supernatural agent (i.e. God) that has the ability to monitor and punish free-riders
can effectively facilitate cooperation and reduce cheating (Bering & Johnson,
2005; Johnson & Kruger, 2004). While fear of punishment from God can serve to
discourage humans from engaging in bad behaviors, it may not be limited to a
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just deterrence effect. Transposing this belief onto the current study, participants
could have given God a high moral rating out of fear that they will be punished in
the future for questioning His moral goodness. In this case, it is not that God’s
commands are divine and infinitely right but rather a fear of punishment from God
that led to the results in the current study.
Can God Be Anthropomorphic And Morally Perfect?
Additionally, although preliminary results suggest that participants think
about humans and God in different ways, the anthropomorphic perspective stated
at the outset cannot be completely ruled out. Common sense tells us that an
individual cannot believe that God is the source of moral truths without first
believing that God exists. And recent studies on the cognitive foundations of
religious beliefs are converging to show that belief in God(s) is at least partly
supported by some of our core cognitive faculties that evolved for other functions
(e.g. Atran & Norenzayan, 2004). One relevant cognitive faculty -theory of mindwhich allows us to understand the mind of other humans also facilitates our mental
representation of God. A deficit in theory of mind is thus associated with a reduced
belief in God, likely due to the inability to represent God’s mind (Norenzayan,
Gervais & Trzesniewski, 2012). As theory of mind and anthropomorphism of God
are closely related mental processes, the corollary is that both processes
necessarily underlie our belief that God’s commands are divine and morally good.
In this respect, the DCT perspective is contingent on God being anthropomorphic
to a certain degree, which seems to imply that participants may, psychologically,
hold both perspectives to be valid at the same time.
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This alternative raises an interesting point for discussion because, in
philosophy, some have argued that the Euthyphro dilemma is logically fallacious –
falling under the category of a false dilemma. In order to better understand this
issue, I turn to philosophical discussions of the Euthyphro dilemma as a false
dilemma and speculate on how it can be applied to the current study. According to
some philosophers, the Euthyphro dilemma can be construed as a false dilemma
because it only provides two options to an argument while other possible
alternatives have not been exhausted (Yandell, 2012). Generally speaking, a
dilemma is a false dilemma if there are one or more viable alternatives outside of
what the dilemma in question offers. So what is a potential alternative? Baggett
and Walls (2011) succinctly laid out the third argument made by philosopher
Plantinga as follows (bolded for emphasis);
“Consider the proposition that it is bad to torture sentient creatures for the
fun of it. Such a proposition is plausibly taken as necessarily true. On Plantinga’s
creative anti-realist view, God believes such a proposition because it is true,
rather than its being true because God believes it. Consistent with Plantinga’s
rejection of universal possibilism, not even God could alter the truth value of
the proposition…His version …is not, however, a pure divine independence
theory…for the proposition expressing such a truth exists due to God’s
thinking it, which he always had and always will. So the proposition
expressing such a necessary truth depends on God, even though God does
not and cannot alter its contents. Of course God has not the slightest intention to
alter it, for there’s perfect resonance between his nature and will.”
The above statement makes the argument that 1) Since God endorses
moral truths because they are true, God does not command what is good based
only on His arbitrary will (i.e., as captured by, “God believes such a proposition
because it is true, rather than its being true because God believes it…not even
God could alter the truth value of the proposition”), however, 2) Moral truths cannot
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exist independently without God conceiving them, because God’s thoughts are
naturally immutable and eternal. And because God’s nature is good, immutable
and everlasting, His own nature determines the moral goodness of moral truths
(i.e., as captured by, “the proposition expressing such a truth exists due to God’s
thinking it, which He always had and always will”). This argument “resolves” the
dilemma by proposing that moral truths are partly dependent and partly
independent of God. Other philosophers have made similar arguments, by
appealing to “God’s good character or nature” as being sufficient for grounding
morality under God’s commands (Copan, 2008).
If there is a philosophical alternative to the Euthyphro dilemma as
suggested above, perhaps there is an equivalently viable alternative for
psychology in understanding how people think about God and morality. Of course,
people do not normally invoke philosophical arguments to support their stand. But
if philosophers are able to generate an argument that “resolves” the dilemma in a
way that both contradictory statements can coexist (at least for theists), I speculate
that people might also be able to do so psychologically. I propose, albeit highly
speculatively, that people can simultaneously hold contradictory beliefs that
psychologically conceptualizes an anthropomorphic God (theologically incorrect)
as well as perceive God to be morally perfect (theologically correct).
Humans are filled with contradictory thoughts and beliefs. Within the realm
of religious beliefs, the Bible has many instances of contradictory statements. For
example, there are statements about how killing is wrong –thou shalt not kill– but
also statements of the opposite; “kill every male among the little ones, and kill
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every woman that hath known man by lying with him” (Numbers 31:17). Similarly,
“thou shalt not kill” is inconsistent with God commanding the Israelites to plunder
the Egyptians in Exodus 11:2. In psychological research on conspiracy theories,
the more participants believed the theory that Princess Diana faked her own death,
the more they believed that she was murdered (study 1). In study 2, the more
participants believed that Osama Bin Laden was already dead when U.S Special
Forces raided his compound, the more they believed he is still alive (Wood,
Douglas & Sutton, 2012). In both studies, both statements are contradictory to
each other, yet they are positively associated.
Anthropomorphism is potentially a useful heuristic for understanding other
nonhuman agents (Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz & Young, 2015). By using the human
mind as a starting point for reasoning about the minds of nonhuman agents, people
can save on cognitive resources by having a familiar schema to work with. Perhaps
then, people intuitively anthropomorphize God in order to understand him as a
person, but explicitly adjust their beliefs about His moral authority to be in line with
their theological understanding of God. As a result, people hold contradictory
beliefs about God, as a person, and His morality, as a divine being, just like how
some philosophers argue that morality is both dependent and independent of God.
Implications
Science vs. Religion As The Moral Authority
“The Great Chain of Being: A study of the history of an idea” is the seminal
work of Lovejoy (1936) that is rooted in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. The
Chain holds that all of creation exists within a universal hierarchy that starts from
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God at the top, to inanimate creatures at the bottom. Entities higher on the Chain
possess greater intellect, mobility, and capability than those lower on the Chain.
Accordingly, the higher entities had more authority over the lower matters, with
God have authority over everything. The ranking of beings under the Chain has
been used as a theoretical framework for understanding people’s moral intuitions
about social targets, because our sense of the moral world is also vertically
situated (Brandt & Reyna, 2013). Different cultures across generations have
commonly associated “up” with the divine and “down” with evil (Russell, 1988).
The current study on moral judgments of God and humans points to the
idea that people with a strong DCT belief are especially likely to use a moral
heuristic akin to the Chain that ranks social targets according to a moral hierarchy,
with God at the top. As God is at the top, His divine attributes (e.g., immortality,
omniscience and perfect moral being) mean that He has sovereignty over moral
truths. Although humans are placed above animals, they are lower in rank than
God, and so are capable of sinning. Therefore, any other entity that tries to wrestle
moral authority away from God should be view negatively because only God can
be morally perfect.
Some have advocated for a view that science and God should be nonoverlapping in their areas of inquiry (Gould, 1997). However, the entry of science
into the fray of providing ultimate answers to the big questions in life (e.g., origins
of the universe) has created a tension between science and religion because their
explanations are often incompatible (Preston & Epley, 2009). The tension is
especially strong when public discourse centers on how science, instead of
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religion, should be the moral authority for moral issues (Harris, 2010). This
proposition is in direct contrast to the view that only God can be the source of moral
truths. Since DCT believers strongly value God as their moral authority, they may
automatically devalue science as a source of morality for fear that it will threaten
their religious belief system. Consistent with this reasoning, people who endorse
a literal interpretation of the Bible are less likely to support public policies that are
scientifically informed (Gauchat, 2015). Additionally, this negative association
between religious belief and perceptions of science is growing over time, possibly
due to how science is increasingly used to answer issues that are moral in nature
(Evans, 2013).
By extension, scientists, or even just people who are perceived to have an
association with science in any way, may be negatively morally evaluated
compared to even just an average person on the streets. Indeed, empirical studies
found that scientists are consistently perceived to be more capable of behaving
immorally in domains of betrayal, disrespect for authority and particularly purity
compared to an average person. (Rutjens & Heine, 2016). Scientists were however
not more likely to behave immoral in domains of harm or unfairness than an
average person.
Prejudice
For people who believe that God plays an unequivocal role in shaping our
moral thoughts and behaviors, atheists are often perceived as moral deviants
because their source of morality does not originate from God’s divine commands.
In turn, prejudice against atheists could be partly due to the perception that they
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are a threat to DCT beliefs (Simpson, Piazza & Rios, 2016). Additionally, prejudice
should not be limited to atheists but any group whose values or beliefs are against
DCT. For example, a person who reads the verse “If a man lies with a male as with
a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put
to death; their blood is upon them” (Leviticus 20:13) might take it to mean that
homosexuality is morally wrong according to God’s divine commands.
Furthermore, people will be likely to perceive evidence that challenge their desired
conclusion (e.g. atheists are immoral) as less compelling (Munro & Ditto, 1997);
they will demand more conclusion incompatible evidence and put them under more
careful examination (Ditto & Lopez, 1992) or engage in confirmation bias by
selectively choosing evidence that conform with their initial conclusion (Nickerson,
1988), all of which reinforces their prejudicial attitudes.
Moral Judgment Process
As mentioned previously in the introduction, several models are proposed
by researchers to account for how moral judgment works. Generally speaking, the
information models begin with the identification of the elements (e.g., intentionality,
causality) of an agent’s behavior prior to a moral judgment. The information models
work well in situations when the target is a human agent. Consistent with the
current findings, when a human target is shown to be responsible for a moral
transgression, participants rated the target low in morality. However, when the
target is God, moral ratings were high even in the immoral condition. The
differential findings for God suggest that perhaps, the biased information
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processing models are more accurate when describing the pathway to a moral
judgment.
The biased information models hold that although elements such as
intentionality may shape judgments of blame, these elements are more directly
influenced by implicit judgments about the badness of an agent (Alicke, 2000).
Hence, the biased models reverse the order such that moral judgments precede,
rather than follow from a careful consideration of the elements involved. This is
consistent with the motivated reasoning perspective, because a desired
conclusion about the agent is already made before features such as intentionality
are considered. Therefore, it is possible that different agents may trigger different
moral judgment processes as captured by the different processing models in the
literature.
Conclusion
Regrettably, this current study is unable to provide answers to the
limitations, future directions and alternative explanations. However, it also implies
that there are more avenues for research on this topic. Furthermore, the
Euthyphro dilemma is not the only philosophical question related our intuitions of
God and morality. The problem of evil (i.e., If an omnipotent, omniscient, and
omnibenevolent god exists, then evil does not. However, there is evil in the
world. Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God does not
exist), and the problem of error, formally known as Descartes’ fourth meditation
(i.e., If we accept that our faculty of judgment comes from God, and that God is a
perfect non-deceiver, then one would arrive at the conclusion that it would be
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impossible for our faculty of judgment to ever go wrong, but they do), are but just
some of the questions that can similarly employ the methods of psychology to
understand people’s intuitions about these philosophical questions. How do
people think about evil and its relationship to God? How can free will account for
human error? It is my hope that the present work not only contributes, however
little, to the existing research on religion and moral psychology, but also opens
up new avenues of research using experimental methods to answer questions in
religious and moral philosophy
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Appendix A
Descriptive statistics for murder scenario
________________________________________________________________
Items
M
SD
________________________________________________________________
1. To what extent is God/the pedestrian moral?

5.00

2.30

2. To what extent is it morally permissible for God/the pedestrian to 4.65

2.36

act this way?
3. To what extent should God/the pedestrian be morally blamed? (R)5.25 2.07
4. To what extent does the pedestrian have good moral standards? 4.90

2.32

________________________________________________________________

Descriptive statistics for robbery scenario
________________________________________________________________
Items
M
SD
________________________________________________________________
1. To what extent is God/the pedestrian moral?

5.02

2.18

2. To what extent is it morally permissible for God/the pedestrian to 4.77

2.20

act this way?
3. To what extent should God/the pedestrian be morally blamed? (R)5.35 1.97
4. To what extent does the pedestrian have good moral standards? 5.03

2.32

________________________________________________________________
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Descriptive statistics for murder scenario
________________________________________________________________
Items
M
SD
________________________________________________________________
1. To what extent is God/the pedestrian moral?

5.03

2.24

2. To what extent is it morally permissible for God/the pedestrian to 4.79

2.23

act this way?
3. To what extent should God/the pedestrian be morally blamed? (R)5.29 2.06
4. To what extent does the pedestrian have good moral standards? 4.95

2.24

________________________________________________________________
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Appendix B
Morality Founded on Divine Authority Scale
Items
1. Everything we need to know about living a moral life God has revealed to us.
2. The truth about morality is revealed only by God.
3. Moral truths are revealed to us by God and God alone.
4. What is morally good and right is what God says is good and right.
5. Making the right moral choice depends on having knowledge of God’s laws.
6. The way to live a moral life is revealed to us by God through Holy Scripture.
7. If you want to know how to live a moral life you should look to God.
8. There are a set of moral truths that God has revealed to us to guide our
thoughts and actions.
9. Acts that are immoral are immoral because God forbids them.
10. We don’t need to try to figure out what is right and wrong, the answers have
already been given to us by God.
11. The way to live a moral life is to follow the example that God has set for us.
12. I trust that God understands what is morally right better than I do.
13. Right and wrong can never be explained with human logic, they can only
come from God’s commands.
14. Without God’s revelation, people would have no way to know right from
wrong.
15. Without God’s help, our sinful nature prevents us from knowing right from
wrong.
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16. Just because there is a religious rule against doing something, that does not
automatically make it morally wrong. (R)
17. It is possible to live a righteous life without knowledge of God’s laws. (R)
18. An atheist can still understand what is morally right and wrong. (R)
19. Without God, humans still have a way to distinguish right from wrong. (R)
20. It is possible to know right from wrong without God’s help. (R)
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Appendix C
Table of means for 2 x 2 factorial design
Condition/Target

Human

God

Moral

6.19

5.83

Immoral

2.89

5.12

Table of means for all 3 way interactions
MFDA Scale
-1SD
Condition/Target

Human

God

Moral

6.17

5.35

Immoral

2.89

3.87

Condition/Target

Human

God

Moral

6.21

6.31

Immoral

2.94

6.09

Condition/Target

Human

God

Moral

6.37

5.19

Immoral

2.88

3.79

+1SD

Religiosity
-1SD
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+1SD
Condition/Target

Human

God

Moral

6.16

6.31

Immoral

2.92

5.84

Condition/Target

Human

God

Moral

6.38

5.98

Immoral

2.76

4.91

Condition/Target

Human

God

Moral

6.15

5.79

Immoral

2.94

5.20

Gender
Males

Females
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Appendix D
Example of all four conditions for the sexual assault scenario
God x Moral scenario
A young woman was walking through a dark alley late one night when a man
suddenly stopped her in her footsteps. He first offered her cash in return for
some sexual favors. When she refused, he attempted to sexually assault her.
God decided to intervene. The woman was saved from being sexually assaulted
by the man.
God x Immoral scenario
A young woman was walking through a dark alley late one night when a man
suddenly stopped her in her footsteps. He first offered her cash in return for
some sexual favors. When she refused, he attempted to sexually assault her.
God could have intervened but did not do so. The woman ended up being
sexually assaulted by the man.
Human x Moral scenario
A young woman was walking through a dark alley late one night when a man
suddenly stopped her in her footsteps. He first offered her cash in return for
some sexual favors. When she refused, he attempted to sexually assault her. A
pedestrian was nearby and decided to intervene. The woman was saved from
being sexually assaulted by the man.
Human x Immoral scenario
A young woman was walking through a dark alley late one night when a man
suddenly stopped her in her footsteps. He first offered her cash in return for
some sexual favors. When she refused, he attempted to sexually assault her. A
pedestrian was nearby and could have intervened but did not do so. The woman
ended up being sexually assaulted by the man.
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Appendix E
Example of how the survey for a participant in the God x Moral scenario looks.
Instructions: Please read the scenarios carefully before answering the questions
Sexual Assault
A young woman was walking through a dark alley late one night when a man
suddenly stopped her in her footsteps. He first offered her cash in return for
some sexual favors. When she refused, he attempted to sexually assault her.
God decided to intervene. The woman was saved from being sexually assaulted
by the man.
1. To what extent is God moral
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

To a great extent
6
7

2. To what extent is it morally permissible for God to act this way
Not at all
1

2

3

4

6

To a great extent
6
7

3. To what extent should God be morally blamed
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

To a great extent
6
7

4. To what extent does God have good moral standards
Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

To a great extent
6
7

Robbery
A woman was opening the door to her house when suddenly a man jumped out
behind the bushes. He held the knife by her throat and ordered her to surrender
her purse. God decided to intervene. The man was stopped from running away
with the purse.
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1.

To what extent is God moral

Not at all
1

2.

4

5

2

3

4

5

To a great extent
6
7

To what extent should God be morally blamed

Not at all
1

4.

3

To what extent is it morally permissible for God to act this way

Not at all
1

3.

2

To a great extent
6
7

2

3

4

5

To a great extent
6
7

To what extent does God have good moral standards

Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

To a great extent
6
7

Murder
A man was driving home from work late one night through a bad neighborhood.
He pulled his car into an alley where nobody would see it. He got out of the car
and walked over to where a homeless woman was sleeping. He pulled out his
knife in an attempt to stab the woman. God decided to intervene. The man was
stopped from stabbing the woman.
1.

To what extent is God moral

Not at all
1

2.

3

4

5

To what extent is it morally permissible for God to act this way

Not at all
1

3.

2

To a great extent
6
7

2

3

4

5

To a great extent
6
7

To what extent should God be morally blamed

Not at all

To a great extent
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1

4.

2

3

4

5

6

7

To what extent does God have good moral standards

Not at all
1

2

3

4

5

To a great extent
6
7

This is followed by the MFDA scale. Below is an example
1. Everything we need to know about living a moral life God has revealed to
us.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

2. The truth about morality is revealed only by God.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

3. Moral truths are revealed to us by God and God alone.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

4. What is morally good and right is what God says is good and right.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

5. Making the right moral choice depends on having knowledge of God’s
laws.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

6. The way to live a moral life is revealed to us by God through Holy
Scripture.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7
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7. If you want to know how to live a moral life you should look to God.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

8. There are a set of moral truths that God has revealed to us to guide our
thoughts and actions.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

9. Acts that are immoral are immoral because God forbids them.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

10. We don’t need to try to figure out what is right and wrong, the answers
have already been given to us by God.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

11. The way to live a moral life is to follow the example that God has set for
us.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

12. I trust that God understands what is morally right better than I do.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

13. Right and wrong can never be explained with human logic, they can only
come from God’s commands.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

14. Without God’s revelation, people would have no way to know right from
wrong.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7
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15. Without God’s help, our sinful nature prevents us from knowing right from
wrong.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

16. Just because there is a religious rule against doing something, that does
not automatically make it morally wrong.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

17. It is possible to live a righteous life without knowledge of God’s laws.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

18. An atheist can still understand what is morally right and wrong.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

19. Without God, humans still have a way to distinguish right from wrong.
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

20. It is possible to know right from wrong without God’s help. (R)
Strongly Disagree
1
2

3

4

5

Strongly Agree
6
7

Age:
What is your sex/gender?
1. Male
2. Female
3. Other
How would you describe your race/ethnicity?
1. White/Caucasian
2. African-American
3. Hispanic
4. Native American
5. Asian
67

6. Mixed
7. Others
What is your current religion?
1. Christian (Catholic)
2. Christian (Baptist)
3. Christian (Other)
4. Hindu
5. Buddhist
6. Muslim
7. Jewish
8. Sikh
9. None
10. Atheist
11. Agnostic
12. Other
How strongly do you believe in God or Gods
Slide scale from 0-100
We are curious about your impressions of the study. Feel free to leave any
feedback on these two questions, if you would like to.
1. Did anything seem odd about this study?
2. Please speculate what you think this study was about.
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